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This paper develops a simple duopoly model in which investments in R&D and patents 
are inputs in the production of firm rents. Patents are necessary to appropriate the returns 
to the firm’s own R&D, but patents also create potential claims against the rents of rival 
firms.  
Analysis of the model reveals a general necessary condition for the existence of a positive 
correlation between the firm’s R&D intensity and the number of patents it obtains. When 
that condition is violated, changes in exogenous parameters that induce an increase in 
firms’ patenting can also induce a decline in R&D intensity. Such a negative relationship 
is more likely when (1) there is sufficient overlap in firms’ technologies so that each 
firm’s inventions are likely to infringe the patents of another firm, (2) firms are 
sufficiently R&D intensive, and (3) patents are cheap relative to both the cost of R&D 
and the value of final output. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper presents a simple model that explores the relationship between the incentive to invent 
and the incentive to obtain patents. Unlike much of the previous literature, we do not treat these 
as a single decision. Instead we explore the factors required for investments in R&D and patents 
to be complementary in the manner typically assumed in most theoretical models and policy 
discussions.  
We derive sufficient conditions for patents and R&D to be substitute inputs in the 
production of firm profits: there must be sufficient overlap between the firms’ patented 
inventions, firms must be sufficiently R&D intensive, and patents must be relatively easy to 
obtain. The first requirement may be due to the nature of a technology, but it can also result from 
the manner in which patents are drafted and examined. The latter two depend both on the 
pecuniary costs of R&D and patents and the standards required for patentable inventions. In such 
environments, firms increase their patenting in order to tax the rents earned on a rival’s 
inventions and to mitigate similar behavior by their rivals. Firms respond by reducing their R&D 
investments.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and 
Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 investigates welfare implications. Section 5 places 
the results in the context of U.S. patent policy and empirical research on the use and effects of 
the patent system. All proofs are found in the appendix.  
2.  The Model 
A measure of consumers have a unit demand for the final output (inventions), which can be 
interpreted as improvements in product quality. There is a competitive fringe of firms that are 
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able to imitate and produce inventions at no cost, but they have no independent R&D capability. 
There are also two firms, sharing the same technology, that are capable of inventing and seeking 
property rights over their inventions. These two firms move simultaneously, deciding on the 
amount of R&D( ) i x to perform and the number of patents   to obtain. Both activities are 
subject to a constant marginal cost, R and C, respectively (final output is the numeraire). The 
required inputs are assumed to be purchased from competitive markets, so these prices also 
represent the social cost of performing R&D and obtaining patents. 
( ) i n
An investment of  i x  in R&D leads to a measure of the final goods invented 
 A firm that obtains a quantity of patents   is able to appropriate a share of 
rents associated with its own innovations. Let 
() ,  1 . ii fx x
α α =< i n
( ) [0,1] i n θ ∈  denote this share and assume it 
follows an exponential distribution; that is,   Ignoring the other firm for a moment, 





i ( ) ( ). ii nfx θ  The remainder,[ ] 1( )( ) i nf x θ − , i  is unprotected, so it is supplied by 
the competitive fringe of imitators. Thus patents are essential to protecting the firm’s return on 
R&D investments.  
In addition, some of the rival’s inventions may infringe one or more of   patents. This 
will depend on the number of patents firm i obtains, and the degree of overlap between the 
inventions produced by each firm. Let 
' is
[0,1) β ∈  denote this degree of overlap. Thus firm 1 may 
claim a share of the rents generated by firm 2 equivalent to 12 ()() . nfx βθ  This includes a share of 
what firm 2 would otherwise earn,  12 ()() nfx θ , and a share,[ ] 2 1( )( ) nf x θ − 2 ,  that would 
otherwise be supplied by the competitive fringe. Firm 2 engages in the same activity, which 
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extracts some rents from firm 1 and some output from the competitive fringe. The objective 
functions of the two firms are thus: 
    ()
1
12 1 1 2 1 1 () 1 () () ()() ,  a n d Vn n f x n f x R x C n θβ θ β θ ≡− + − −
    ()
2
21 2 2 1 2 () 1 () () ()() . Vn n f x n f x R x C θβ θ β θ ≡− + − − 2 n
The parameterβ  is a parsimonious way of modeling the degree to which a firm’s 
property rights depend on their inventions. When 0, β = each firm derives rents only from its own 
R&D investments. When 10 , β >>a firm is able to lay claim to the inventions of others, but not 
as easily as it can claim inventions of its own making. Note that while the exact mechanism of 
the transfers is not specified in the model, holding R&D constant, the transfers impose no losses 
in the total potential rents that can be earned.  
How should we interpretβ ? For some industries it is a question of technology. Firms 
may draw from similar technical fields and arrive at similar solutions even when they apply them 
to different problems. This is particularly true for industries that advance through cumulative 
innovation and where firms may rely on a largely common set of building blocks derived from 
previous innovations. In addition, some products incorporate several, if not dozens, of potentially 
patentable innovations. Two examples might include semiconductors and computer software.   
The size of β  might also depend on the breadth of claims contained in patents.
1 If broad 
claims are regularly granted, it is more likely that firms will infringe each other’s patents. Under 
this interpretation it is possible that patent breadth, and therefore β , can be influenced by 
policymakers or the courts.  
                                                 
1 The trade-off between patent breadth and length is studied in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990). 
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A third, and more controversial, interpretation is thatβ  is a measure of a firm’s 
effectiveness in obtaining property rights over things it has not really invented. While this is 
explicitly prohibited by U.S. patent law, it might nevertheless arise from mistakes in the 
examination of patent applications. This is a topic that has received considerable attention in 
recent years (FTC 2003, Jaffe and Lerner 2004, Merrill, Levin and Myers 2004). 
This may be a particular problem for patents on computer programs, especially ones that 
implement methods of doing business, if the patent law’s disclosure requirements are not 
adequately enforced.
2 In that case, one might not be certain what the applicant has invented and 
how far his or her claims should extend. In these areas, some researchers and practitioners worry 
that applicants can obtain relatively broad patents even though they have not yet started their 
R&D (Burk 2002, Burk and Lemley 2002, Flynn 2001, FTC 2003 (chapter 4)).    
3.  Equilibrium and Comparative Static Results 
The first order conditions for firm 1 are  
[1]  () 12 1 10 fR θβ θ ′ − −=, and  
[2]  () ( ) { } 12 1 2 11 ff C θβ θβ −− + − = 0 ,
                                                
 
where the subscripts refer to the variable for the appropriate firm. Note that in   the increase in 
revenue associated with additional R&D reflects the effect of firm 1’s patenting and that of its 
rival, which the firm takes as given. In  , the increase in revenue resulting from additional 
patenting includes the additional revenue firm 1 can extract from its rival. 
[1]
[2]
The first order conditions imply the following relationship between R&D and patenting:   
 
2 See 35 USC 112. An applicant must describe his or her invention in sufficient detail that a person skilled in the 












⎛⎞ ⎡ ′ −
= ⎜⎟
⎤
⎢ ⎥ −−+ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 
Let   denote the relative cost of the inputs and  / PR C ≡ ( ) ( ) 12 12 1 11 2 . f ff τβ θ β θ β ≡− − + ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦  
Thus when R&D is significantly more expensive than patenting, the firm will obtain more 
patents for every increment of R&D it performs. The wedge 1 τ  is decreasing in the rival’s R&D 
investments and patenting, and inβ , but is increasing in the firm’s own R&D.  
 Substituting  (  in  ) 1
n ne θ












Thus, holding constant the rival’s behavior, firm i’s patent portfolio is strictly increasing in the 
amount of R&D it performs.   
Proposition 1: If the costs of obtaining patents (C) and doing R&D (R) are sufficiently small, 
there exists a unique, symmetric interior equilibrium,(,
** () ) , x nx  in pure 
strategies.  
The proof is provided in the appendix. A sufficient condition for satisfying the second order 
condition and the participation constraint is that CC ≤ %  where  












=+ − − ⎨⎬
−− ⎩⎭
%  
Figure 1 plots this constraint in the space of input prices. Note that as we increase the output 
elasticity,α , the constraint rotates clockwise. If we consider higher values ofβ , the combination 
of input prices where an interior equilibrium exists becomes slightly smaller.   
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Next, we derive some of the comparative static properties of the equilibrium. The proofs 
are found in the appendix.  
Proposition 2:  The equilibrium number of patents,  is decreasing in both the cost of 
obtaining patents (C) and the cost of doing R&D (R). The equilibrium level of 
R&D, 
*, n
*, x  is decreasing in the cost of doing R&D. The equilibrium level of 
R&D,
*, x  is decreasing (increasing) in the cost of obtaining patents (C) when 
 
* 12 ()0 x βθ −> ()
* 12 ()0 . x βθ −<
Thus the model generates the typical input price responses for patents, but not always for R&D. 
Ordinarily we expect that, where patents are essential to appropriating returns to innovation, 
reducing the cost of obtaining these property rights encourages more R&D. Proposition 2 shows 
this intuition holds only when the rival firm cannot extract a majority of the potential rents 
associated with firm   innovations. This is ensured if  's i 12 , β <  but not otherwise. If  12 , β ≥  
and firms are sufficiently active in their R&D and patenting, reductions in the cost of patenting 
will reduce R&D. In the appendix we show the following: 
Corollary 1:   Suppose  12 β ≥ . Then, ifCC ≤ % , 
* 12 ()0 x βθ − ≤  when   where  ˆ CC ≤








− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
=− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
Figures 2 and 3 plot this constraint in the space of input prices, and we include the earlier 
constraint C . The only difference between them is that figure 3 assumes a higher output 
elasticity (0.85) than figure 2 (0.50).  In figure 2 
%
ˆ CC < % , so the set of input prices that ensures 
existence of an interior equilibrium can be divided into a region where R&D is decreasing in the 
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cost of patenting and another where R&D is increasing in the cost of patents. In figure 3,  , 
which implies there is no interior equilibrium where a decrease in the cost of patenting would 
increase R&D. 
ˆ CC ≥ %
4.  Welfare Analysis 
What would a social planner do? It is easy to show that the amount of innovation in the private 
equilibrium is always less than the first best outcome.
3 In the first best solution, patents are 
unnecessary. In a second best world, and where R&D subsidies cannot be funded from an 
external source, the social planner may “tax” patenting to stimulate private R&D investments.  
To be concrete, suppose the planner can levy a tax ε  such that the private cost of 
obtaining a patent is now  , cCε =+ where C continues to denote the social cost of resources 
devoted to patent prosecution. The planner chooses ε  to maximize 
** () ,
* f xR x C n −−  where 
(
** , ) x n  denote the outcomes of the symmetric private equilibrium with firms responding to the 
input prices R and c. In the appendix, we prove the following: 
Proposition 3:  A social planner limited to taxing patent activity always chooses a level of tax 
ε  so that  .   ˆ (,] cC C ∈ %
In other words, the social planner will never permit the private cost of patents to be so low that 
the counterintuitive outcome defined in Proposition 2 would occur. The intuition follows 
immediately from the first order condition to the planner’s problem: 
 
**




∂ ′ ⎡⎤ − −= ⎣⎦ ∂
 
                                                 
3 This is true even if we assumeβ  is also a measure of the degree of overlap in the firms’ R&D programs. 
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So long as 
* 0 dn dc <  (see appendix) the first order condition can be satisfied only if the planner 
chooses ε , so that 
* 0. dx dc <  At an optimum, the planner is trading off marginal reductions in 
the number of inventions that are worth 
* () 0 fx R ′ − >  against marginal reductions in resources 
devoted to patenting, which cost C. 
Thus far we have treated the overlap parameterβ  as an exogenous aspect of the 
technological environment. Suppose the social planner has some control over the magnitude 
ofβ , perhaps through legal doctrines that determine the breadth of patent claims. What would 
she do? In the appendix, we show: 
Proposition 4:  is decreasing in
* n β . A sufficient condition for 
* 0 x β ∂ ∂<is  12 . α ≥  
Thus the social planner would prefer less overlap and therefore more narrow patents. Firms 
would respond, however, by increasing their patent activity. These results, however, depend on 
some stark attributes of the model. If it were generalized to consider the possibility of differential 
effects of patent breadth for one’s own inventions compared to the rival’s inventions, it is likely 
the comparative static calculation for 
* x β ∂ ∂  would be more ambiguous. 
There is, of course, another obvious remedy—merge the two firms. This would 
internalize the problem created by the overlap and, in the absence of imitation by the competitive 
fringe, attain the first best outcome. But once the model is generalized to include racing, a single 
firm may do less R&D than two firms (Lee and Wilde 1980), and this would be compounded in a 
dynamic model where the monopolist is concerned about replacing its own profits (Reinganum 
1985). 
8  
5.  Discussion 
This paper develops a simple model that illustrates the relationship between firms’ R&D and 
patenting decisions. It is typically the case that these two activities are complementary—firms 
that do a lot of R&D also tend to patent more. And ordinarily, reducing the cost of R&D, or of 
patenting, will stimulate additional investments in R&D. 
But as the model illustrates, this intuition does not always hold. Each firm cares about the 
patent strategies of its rival, which affects the rents it earns on its own discoveries, as well as the 
rents earned when the rival infringes its own patents. A necessary condition is a significant 
overlap between the rights granted to each firm (β  must be at least ½). Then, if firms are 
sufficiently active in their R&D and patenting, incremental reductions in the cost of obtaining 
patents result in less, rather than more R&D. This does not imply the elimination of R&D 
investments, but rather less innovation than would otherwise occur.  
Thus there may be instances where raising patent costs can actually induce more R&D. 
This might be achieved via a patent tax or by increasing the requirements that must be satisfied 
in order to obtain a patent. For example, policymakers could increase the inventive step (the 
standard of nonobviousness in U.S. law) required to obtain a patent so that the most trivial 
advances over the prior art do not qualify for patent protection (Hunt 1999).  
The model suggests that the perverse outcome is more likely to occur in high-tech 
industries that advance rapidly via cumulative innovation (and which also obtain many patents) 
than in industries that are not research intensive and which do not build up large patent 
portfolios.
4 Previous empirical work has identified a number of industries with such 
                                                 
4 A similar intuition obtains from dynamic models of innovation. Hunt (2004) shows that a low inventive step, 
making patents easy to obtain, can reduce the rate of innovation in industries where R&D is the most productive.   
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characteristics, including electronics, computers, and semiconductors (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen 
Nelson, and Walsh 2000; Hall and Ziedonis 2001). These industries account for most of the rapid 
growth in U.S. patenting in recent years (Hall 2003). They are also the industries where 
researchers identify what is sometimes called “strategic patent” behavior, including the assembly 
of large portfolios for wholesale cross-licensing and possibly deceptive patent prosecution 
(Grindley and Teece 1997, Graham and Mowery 2004).  
Bessen and Hunt (2003) present empirical results consistent with the phenomenon 
modeled here in the context of patenting computer software. Obtaining such patents was 
difficult, but not impossible, during the 1970s and early 1980s. Over time, however, courts have 
become more receptive to such patents and their numbers have grown rapidly, especially among 
firms in the industries described above (and much less so among firms in the software industry). 
All else equal, firms that concentrated on obtaining software patents experienced a statistically 
and economically significant decline in their R&D intensity relative to other firms.   
Of course, this is a highly stylized model that omits a number of important considerations 
from the analysis. For example, the deleterious effects of excessive patenting might be mitigated 
via cross-licensing or patent pools, assuming these can be negotiated without excessive 
transactions costs.
5 Both of these solutions raise a new set of questions, particularly in the 
context of antitrust policy, which are not addressed here.
6  
Nor is it immediately obvious that successful licensing arrangements improve innovation 
incentives in an environment of “cheap” patents. Bessen (2003) develops a model of “patent 
                                                 
5 FTC (2003), Chapter 3, provides a detailed discussion of reasons why these transactions costs may be large for 
some industries. For an empirical analysis of the effects of fragmented property rights in the semiconductor industry, 
see Ziedonis (2003). 
6 See, for example, the papers by Choi (2003), Farrell and Shapiro (2005), and Shapiro (2001, 2003).  
10  
thickets” and examines the efficacy of licensing in a regime of either high or low patent 
standards. He finds that under low patent standards firms are able to assemble large patent 
portfolios, which they use to make aggressive licensing demands. This encourages more 
patenting, but less R&D. Under higher standards, such a strategy is not cost effective.  
There are a number of interesting extensions to consider. For example, one could make 
the cost of obtaining a certain measure of patents depend on the amount of R&D the firm does. 
All else equal, this would tend to reduce the space of parameter values where the counterintuitive 
outcome described in Proposition 2 would occur. Another generalization is to analyze an 
asymmetric environment in which an established firm, with a preexisting patent portfolio and 
capital stock, competes with one or more potential entrants. That would allow us to examine 
issues such as hold-up and entry deterrence. This is a topic for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 1:  
We begin by checking the second order condition to the firm problem. Substituting [4] into   and 
rearranging terms, we have 
1 0 n V =
[ ] 21 1 10 fR x C αβ θ α τ Ψ≡ − − − = .  
The first derivative is 







1 . βθα θα θ τ
∂Ψ
≡− −− − −
∂
 
In order to ensure the first order conditions are associated with a local maximum when  0 β =  (which 
implies  1 τ = ), we need 
*
11 () x θ α > . This will ensure we have an interior equilibrium when firm 1’s profits 
are generated only from the inventions it invents. Let  x %  denote the value of x s.t. 
*
11 () x θ α = when firm 2 is 
playing the same strategy (i.e., in the symmetric case). Since θ  is strictly increasing in x,  1 0 x ψ ∂∂ <  
x x ∀> % . Thus for the symmetric case, if there is a local maximum, it will be unique. Using [4], we can 











Substituting for  () f xx
α =  in  , again assuming symmetric behavior, yields  











Substituting α  for θ  in the previous expression and equating it to  x %  allows us to solve for the critical cost 
of obtaining patents in terms of R, β , and α : 
() [] ()
2 1





αβ α β α
− ⎧⎫
≤≡− + − − ⎨⎬
⎩⎭
 
For values of CC < , the second order condition is satisfied even when  0 β = .  
Next, we need to verify that  . Substituting for 
**
11 (, () )0 Vx nx ≥
*
1 x  and   from the first order conditions,  
*
1 n
[ ] () [ ] ( ) { }
**
11 2 1 2 1 1 1 (, () ) 1 1 1 ( 1 ) . Vx nx f f L n βθ β θ ατ θ θ =− + − + − −  
For symmetric case when  x x = %  the expression in brackets reduces to  [ ] ( ) { } 11 ( 1 Ln ) . α ατ α α −+ − −  This 
is positive for sufficiently small values of τ , but is negative for  1. τ =  Thus, in order to ensure the 
participation constraint is satisfied when  0 β = , we require a value of CC λ = %  s.t. 
[ ] [ ] { } ( , ( )) ( ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0, Vxnx fx C L n βα αα λ α =+ − − + − = %% %  






















− ⎧⎫ ⎧ ⎫
== ⎨⎬ ⎨ ⎬
− ⎩⎭ ⎩ ⎭
%  
This implies that  (1 ) [0,1]. Ln λ αα =− − ∈  Thus the second order condition and the participation 
constraint are satisfied when  
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Proof of Propositions 2 and 4: 
We return to the first order conditions for the symmetric equilibrium: 
() 1( ) x Vf x θβ θ ′ =− − = 0 R  
[ ] (1 ) ( ) 1 (1 ) 0 n Vf x C θβ θ =− + − −= 
The associated Jacobian is  
() ( )
() ()
1( 1 ) 1 2
,




θβ θ θ β θ
θβ θ θ β θ
′′ ′ −− −
=
′ −+ − − − + − ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
which reduces to  
() [] () []
2 1




θβ θ β θ
θα




0 J > for values of  . CC ≤ %  The comparative static results follow: 
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′ ′ − − ∂− ⎧ − ⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =⋅ = − − + − < ⎡⎤ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ∂− − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
0  
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=⋅ = + − < ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∂
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⎧ ⎫ ′ ′ − ∂− − ⎪ ⎪ ⎛⎞ =⋅ = − − + − ⎨ ⎬ ⎜⎟ ∂− − ⎝⎠ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩⎭
 
A sufficient condition for 
* 0 x β ∂∂ ≤  is 
* ()1 2 x θ ≥ , which is assured if  12 α ≥ . 
Proof of Corollary 1: 










= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 
To determine when 
* ˆ, x x ≥ we insert ˆ x  into [1] and solve for values of C that satisfy: 
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≤≡ − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
The social planner imposes a tax, ε  so that firms pay cCε = +  in order to obtain patents. The planner 
chooses ε to maximize   where 
** * () () () Wx fx R x C nx =− −
* ** (, () ) x nx  represent the firms’ choice of 
R&D and patents in a symmetric equilibrium with input costs R and c. The associated first order condition 
is given in the text. Substituting for R and C using, [1] and [2], we find that 
[] [ ] ** * 11
( ) ( ) 1( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
1( 1)




⎧⎫ −− ⎪⎪ =+ − + − − ≥ ⎨⎬
+− ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
,  
where the inequality is strict as long as 
* x < ∞. This implies there is a region of input costs just above the 
set defined by   where the planner would be willing to subsidize R&D (from some outside source) to 
make an interior equilibrium feasible. But we have ruled this out in the proposition. 
C %
The proof requires that 
* 0. dn dC ≤  The derivative itself is 
() ()
** * * * 1
1( 1 ) 1 2
dn n n x dn
ff
d CCx C J d x
θβ θ θ β θ .
⎧ ⎫ ∂∂ ∂ ′′ ′ =+⋅= −− − − ⎨ ⎬
∂∂ ∂ ⎩⎭
 
Substituting c for C in [2] implies 
* ( nL n c M =− )  where  [ ] ()1 ( 1 ) Mf x β θ ≡+ −   [ ] ()1 ( ) f xc M β =+  
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=− = ⋅ ≡ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ ++ ⎝⎠
′
 
 Returning to our derivative: 
( )





θβ θ θα β θ
η
θα β θ
′ −− − ⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ −− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
<  
If it is feasible (i.e.,  ), the social planner sets  ˆ CC < % ε so that 
() ( )






θβ θ θα β θ
η
θα β θ
′ −− ⎧ ⎫ ⎛⎞ −− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ′−= +
−
⎨ ⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
 
Otherwise, it sets ε so that    . CC ε += %









Note: Boundaries are defined by   (see text). 




 interior equilibrium ∃
interior equilibrium ∃ /
0.50 α =
0.75 α =
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 interior equilibrium ∃